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As Martha Nussbaum recounts to some extent in The Fragility o f Goodness,1 and as I have 
shown before in greater detail,2 Plato explicitly uses the notion of catharsis in his epistemic, 
educational, ethical, political, and artistic theories. For instance, in the Sophist he says that 
catharsis is the separating of the bad from the good so that the good parts are left in a better state; 
hence, in terms of the acquistion of knowledge on the part of a student, “refutation {ton elenchon 
lekteon) is the greatest of the purifications (katharseön).”3 That is, the student will be left more 
purified, with a more appropriate modesty in regards to learning, when his conceit is purged.
Plato also states in the Phaedo that the moral ideal is the katharsis of the emotions,4 and in his 
political treatises he indicates that the polis may be justifiably cleansed by its rulers, who, in 
dispensing with evil influence and bad poets through either exile or death, purify the state 
(katharmous poleos).5 The cognate katharon — “pure” -- also enters in Plato’s related 
ontological theory in the Symposium, when he claims that the form of Beauty is pure. By 
implication, any instantiations of artistic beauties would be sullied.6 Clearly, then, catharsis and its 
cognate katharon can be found throughout Plato’s philosophy in general.
Because of the pervasiveness of catharsis in his theories, and because he stresses in the 
Laws that song and dance in religious rituals can give beneficial psychological relief from fear,7 it 
is hard to imagine that Plato did not recognize the possibility that tragedy gives catharsis, in spite 
of his silence on the issue. It is even harder to see why catharsis would not be a perfectly 
allowable goal of tragedy for him, even had he not seen the possibility himself, because a person 
whose emotions are catharted is morally ideal for him, as indicated already. Plato, we all know, 
does say that a representation of bad men or of pitiable events will tend to corrupt good citizens 
by feeding and inflaming their passions and by overruling reason.8 Apparently, for him, the 
benefits of any catharsis would not or could not begin to outweigh either the other psychological 
effects or the ethical and political damage. In this case, a theory that advocates catharsis for 
tragedy, such as Aristotle supposedly has, would not, in and of itself, appear to be an effective 
answer to Plato.9
Whether or not all of the aforementioned points are taken into account, it is thought by 
Nussbaum and by many others, of course, that Aristotle responds to Plato with the doctrine of 
catharsis.10 However, there is no clear extant Peripatetic textual evidence which supports that 
view, and although Richard Janko may be right in claiming recently that a work of the Epicurean 
Philodemus refers to Peripatetic doctrine that includes catharsis, on Janko’s own account the 
doctrine is from On Poets. This is agreed to be an early work, when Aristotle was still greatly 
under the influence of Plato, and so the work is hardly Peripatetic. Moreover, as James Hutton, 
Francis Sparshott, Paul Woodruff, and Alexander Nehamas have demonstrated in their own ways, 
Aristotle agrees with his mentor much more than is often thought Aristotle says, for instance, in 
Poetics 15 that unnecessary bad character should be kept out of tragedy and in Politics V I I17 
that indecent pictures and speeches should be banned from the stage. In short, given all of the
above, there is no clear reason why Aristotle should be held as responding specifically to Plato 
with the doctrine of catharsis.
The only obvious ancient textual support for the view that catharsis is central to the 
Peripatetic’s defense of tragedy stems from neo-Platonists living more than six hundred years after 
Aristotle: Iamblichus in the 3rd and 4th century, Proclus in the 5th, and Olympiodorus in the 
6th.11 All of these figures suggest directly or indirectly that Aristotle is using the notion of 
catharsis to counter Plato, but none cite any relevant passages and, given their problematic 
summaries, it is very doubtful that they really captured Aristotle's view.12 Aristotle in the extant 
corpus actually responds with catharsis to the Platonic denigration of art in but one instance, 
when he defends ecstatic melodies in Politics VIH 7. However, catharsis is employed there to 
defend only that one kind of melody, and is no explicit justification even for the other kinds of 
melodies, much less for tragedy. Some commentators have tried to find an implicit defense of 
tragedy on thé basis of catharsis in Pol Vffl 7, but unsuccessfully in my view, for reasons I cannot 
give here because of limitations of space.13 I have suggested in the longer version of this 
introduction that we can find Aristotle’s most articulate defense of tragedy shallowly buried in 
Politics VIE 17 when he claims that education will protect young adults against the harmful effects 
of comedy and “such events” (toioutôn gignomenés). “Such events” seem to include tragedy 
given the discussion in the passage that immediately follows of Theodorus, whom Aristotle calls a 
tragic actor (1336b29).
In spite of all of this, it may still be thought that Aristotle uses catharsis in order to hoist 
Plato on an Athenian javelin of Plato’s own making or that Aristotle is using catharsis against 
someone else. However, Jonathan Lear and others, including some of those mentioned already, 
have powerfully argued that none of the three commonly-accepted meaning of catharsis -  
purgation, purification, and clarification -- can represent Aristotle’s meaning of the term in the 
definition of tragedy, given the severe inconsistencies that result with the rest of his own 
theories.14
Today, rather than look for another meaning of catharsis that would be consistent with 
genuine Aristotelian doctrine, or rather than argue in a new way how catharsis might have been 
employed by Aristotle against Plato or against any other predecessor for that matter, I take a fresh 
approach. I start with Aristotle’s theory of definition in order to claim that Aristotle could not 
reasonably have included the catharsis clause in the definition of tragedy on his own strictures. 
Moreover, in case we could solve this problem, I expose some very serious shortcomings that 
result in the Poetics itself, which are never or rarely acknowledged, if the catharsis clause is kept. 
Finally, given statements of Strabo and Plutarch, I suggest that the clause was probably a 
mistaken interpolation by an editor who repaired a damaged Aristotelian manuscript or who 
imagined that he was augmenting deficient Aristotelian doctrine. M.D. Petrusevski ingeniously 
thought that the original manuscript contained the words pramatön sustasin, “actions brought 
together,” that the words were corrupted, and unfortunately restored as we have them, 
pathématân katharsin.15 However, I shall argue ultimately that the whole catharsis clause, 
whether or not intended as a repair, is an illegitimate addition and should be marked accordingly.
P a rt I: The Posterior Analytics, and  C atharsis in Epic
More than a few commentators have recognized the link between the definition of tragedy and 2
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ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY: PRELIMINARY 
DIVISION FROM Chs 1-3 OF THE Poetics 
(M ow ing Bywater)
Aristotle's general theory of definition as found in his logical or scientific treatises. A few such as 
M.P. Battin also remark that the account of tragedy provides the only example in the Aristotelian 
treatises of the procedure that for Aristotle is crucial in obtaining scientific knowledge.16 
Commentators often rightly see, too, how the definition in Ch 6 results from a preliminary 
diaeresis, and they observe that the catharsis clause is the only part of the definition missing from 
a preliminary division, which is a serious problem on Aristotle's own account of definition. 
However, their resolutions to this problem appear to be very unsatisfactory, as a look at the final 
definition itself and then the preliminary divisions themselves shall begin to show. In Ch 6, 
Aristotle says:
Let us now discuss tragedy, taking up its definition (boron tés ousias) that results 
from what has been said. Tragedy is a representation of an action that, having a 
certain magnitude, is serious and complete; in “sweetened” language, each kind 
brought in separately in the parts of the work; in the manner of drama, not 
narrative; through pity and fear accomplishing the catharsis of such emotions (dif 
eleou kai phobou perainousa ten tön toioutön pathématôn katharsin).
Actually,
mathëmatcn is mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
found in place of 
pathématôn in the 
manuscript that is 
considered to be 
our best authority, 
namely, Parisinus 
1741, so the last 
phrase means 
something like “the 
catharsis of such 
learning.” This 
reading, however, 
has never gained 
acceptance, and in 
my view would also 
be unworkable.
Hence, for the 
moment I follow 
the commonplace 
emendation.17 In 
Aristotle’s words, 
then, the definition 
has been gathered 
“from what has 
been said.”
According to
mtraests
/
arts not using all three: 
i dancing, music, “the nameless 
art” o f language, etc.
simultaneous use (dithyramb, 
nomes)
I ·
object is “had” men: comedy
/
not full-fledged “acting and 
doing”; epic
arts using aE three means of 
mimesis -  “rhythm*’ o r ordered 
body-movement, language, and 
harmony [Ch. 1 ,1447f>25]
sequential use o f the means: 
tragedy and comedy [Ch. 1* 
1447b27|
object o f mimesis is “good” 
men in action [Ch. 2J; tragedy 
and epic
manner of mimesis is “acting 
and doing”: tragedy [Ch. 3]
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Chart I
By water, this means by a dichotomous diaeresis, which, as commonly known, is the method to be 
used before a collection of traits in a final definition takes place (see Chart l) .18 However, the 
divisions from Chs 1-3 are only partial: two remaining conditions in the final definition, “having a 
certain magnitude” and “complete,” are obtained from Chs 4 & 5.19 More importantly, as 
mentioned, the condition of catharsis has no previous discussion, much less a previous division, 
which throws not only its legitimacy but that of the whole definition into doubt20 This is because 
in the Posterior Analytics Π 13, Aristotle says that, when defining by division, one should admit 
only crucial elements, arrange them in the right order, and not omit any.21 In addition, Aristotle 
says in the Metaph V I I12 that the differentia must be of previous differentia, thereby implying 
that the ordering of the parts in the final definition cannot be randomly juxtaposed.22 These 
strictures, then, undermine the integrity of the entire definition of tragedy, not only because the 
division for catharsis is missing but also because the ordering of some of the parts is different from 
the preliminary divisions. For instance, the first divisions in Ch 1 are of the means of mimesis, but 
the corresponding properties do not appear in the final definition until after the object of mimesis, 
namely, a representation of good men, which itself had not been introduced until Ch 2 .
Optionally, Aristotle could be employing in the Poetics another kind of definition, which 
Gerald Else considers and which is found in the Parts o f Animals 1 3. According to this treatise, 
one makes a series of different and separate mini-divisions before collecting all of the final 
characteristics.23 In this procedure, the order of the final collection appears unimportant as long 
as all the differentia are collected. Yet even if Else is right on this point, the catharsis clause, 
including the terms “pity,” “fear,” and “catharsis” themselves, has not been broached in the first 
five chapters of the Poetics. Thus, the definition of tragedy cannot be a good definition on either 
of the two “scientific” accounts of definition, and this is because no previous division of any kind 
containing the relevant terms was introduced.
Bywater and Hutton do not seem to recognize fully the ramifications of the inconsistency 
of the Poetics with the Post An.24 Else does recognize an omission but does not think a solution 
is needed, probably because for him the definition is in the process of being formulated.25 Battin 
astutely recognizes the problem but without any supporting argument says “the fact that 
[Aristotle] was willing...to spoil an otherwise perfectly straightforward and rigorous definition to 
include the notion of catharsis suggests that he accorded it more than ordinary importance, and 
surely considered it a central feature of tragedy” (p. 301). Later, I shall consider an opposite 
conclusion, that spoiling a perfectly straightforward and rigorous definition is not a mark of 
centrality, but for the moment it is important to note briefly that others, including O.B. Hardison, 
Jr.26 and Martha Nussbaum,27 have thought that an anticipation of the catharsis clause actually 
takes place in Chapter 4. They claim that the discussion there of pleasure in learning is the core of 
the idea that catharsis captures, asserting that catharsis means clarification. However, as alluded 
to already, numerous reasons can be and have been given, for instance, by Lear to show that such 
a view involves a distorted interpretation of Aristotle’s theory and that catharsis cannot really 
mean clarification.28 Even leaving aside these reasons, the other terms in the definition are 
without a doubt the same ones that are used in Chs 1-5 and the relation of catharsis, pity, and fear 
to pleasure in learning is so indirect that Hardison’s and Nussbaum’s claim seems to be a case of 
trying to save Aristotle at any cost.
I myself see but two ways out of the bind. The first is the easy but radical solution of
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athetizing the catharsis passage in the definition of tragedy ~  radical because it breaks one of the 
current rules of ancient scholarship, which is to accept the manuscript reading at all or virtually all 
costs. This radical solution, however, immediately restores the integrity of the definition, and, as 
we shall see, obviates the need to resolve a host of other problems. However, because athetesis 
admittedly should be used only as an absolutely last resort, the second way must be pursued first. 
That way reveals Aristotle to be employing another kind of definition, one which is outlined also 
in the Posterior Analytics.29 This kind, akin to our use of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
stresses finding the combination of features that gets the extension correct and contains no explicit 
condition that initial divisions be presented before a collection takes place. Assuming he uses this 
form of definition, Aristotle could have simply included the catharsis clause in the definition of 
tragedy without employing a previous corresponding mini-division, even if he wished, as he does, 
to rely on previous mini-divisions for all of the other final differentiae. Moreover, since it is often 
agreed that the Poetics is a series of lecture notes, it might be that Aristotle added the catharsis 
clause some years after a first redaction. This solution on the surface appears satisfactory, but 
does it really hold up to examination?
First, if Aristotle included the catharsis clause in his initial draft, why did he incorporate 
the prefatory phrase indicating that the definition “results from what had already been said,” when 
nothing indeed had been said about catharsis? If Aristotle added the catharsis clause in a later 
redaction, the prefatory phrase could easily have been deleted in the Greek without impairing the 
sense of the passage. More crucially, if the catharsis clause were a later interpolation, why does 
he not add any explanation of it in either Ch 6 or 7?30 The raison d'etre of these chapters without 
doubt is to explain the elements in the definition, and each and every other one except catharsis is 
covered in significant detail in those two chapters, and at some length in the subsequent parts of 
the treatise. Even music and the spectacle that attends the dramatic form31 of tragedy are treated 
with concern in Chs 6 ,14, and 18,32 and in Chs 24 and 26,33 although Aristotle apparently prefers 
to leave the fullest discussion of these two “aesthetic” elements to other treatises or to other 
thinkers.34 In marked contrast, the term “catharsis” itself is only mentioned a second and last time 
in the whole Poetics when Aristotle discusses in Ch 17 how a playwright should sketch the outline 
of a plot and then fill in the details. Offering the drama of Orestes as an illustration, he recounts 
that the protagonist is captured because of his madness and saved by means of the purificatory 
rite (dia tes katharseôs). But this use of catharsis is utterly irrelevant to the definition of tragedy 
and could easily have been included whether or not catharsis is an essential condition of tragedy. 
Hence, assuming that Aristotle himself included the catharsis phrase in the definition of tragedy, 
even in a later redaction, it is extremely puzzling why he did not add any relevant explanation in 
Chs 6-7, if only the brief note that he would discuss catharsis later. Without at least a note, his 
discussion of the parts of the definition is gravely incomplete.
A reply to this charge of incompleteness might run as follows: Let us assume that the 
cartharsis clause is included in the definition in order to supply the final cause of tragedy, namely, 
its purpose, and let us consider the other elements in the definition to be formal or material 
causes. Because Aristotle only desires to explicate these latter types of causes in Chs 6-7, it might 
be said that he has good reason not to mention catharsis there. However, this reply would ignore 
that Aristotle does discuss the effects of the necessary parts in the chapters, including, for 
instance, that of spectacle. Given his concern with those effects, he likewise would have been
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concerned with discussing the effect of the whole tragedy. More tellingly, he says with no 
hesitation in Ch 6 that “the plot is the end and purpose of the tragedy, and the end is everywhere 
the chief thing.”35 So, it is the plot and not catharsis that is the end of tragedy, and were catharsis 
instead the final cause, for him not to add a qualifying remark at this statement would be a blunder 
of immense proportions.36 At the least, it would cause extreme confusion in a chapter that is in 
many ways a model of explanation.
Other passages dealing with the function of tragedy also exhibit a callous disregard for 
catharsis, were it really part of the definition. In Ch 14 Aristotle declares that we should not seek 
from tragedy every kind of pleasure but the one proper to it, and that the poet should use 
representation to produce the pleasure (hedone) from pity and fear.37 Pleasure may be, of course, 
related to catharsis as something that usually follows as a result of the cathartic process, but 
pleasure and catharsis are different phenomena, as Pol VED 7 reveals at 1342al5. What Ch 14 
really shows is that the psychological end of tragedy for Aristotle is to give a kind of pleasure that 
also involves a pain, analogous, say, in culinary terms to eating bittersweet chocolate. It is the 
kind of mixed pleasure that Plato discusses in the Philebus, for which tragedy and comedy are 
cited as examples.38 Conversely, Aristotle never even hints in Ch 14 that the end of tragedy is to 
give catharsis.
With the catharsis clause included in the definition, the subsequent discussions in Chs 6 
and 14 of the function or end of tragedy are glaringly deficient. With the catharsis clause omitted, 
the end of tragedy is either the plot or is for a certain kind of (mixed) pleasure, which, especially if 
plot is the internal end and pleasure the external end, fits in very smoothly with the passages 
already mentioned and with other discussions in the final chapters, as we shall see later. It might 
be said to all of this that pity and fear are mentioned or suggested in at least the discussion of Ch 
14, and that this is enough of an allusion to catharsis to connect it with pitiable and fearful 
pleasure, given the mention of pity, fear, and catharsis in the definition. In other words, it might 
be said that, in discussing pity and fear, Aristotle is, in effect, discussing catharsis. But this merely 
raises new problems or highlights more intensely old ones. For instance, why is catharsis still 
ignored in the explanation of the elements of the definition in Chs 6 and 7, and also why are pity 
and fear not even mentioned there? Where is the preliminary discussion of those emotions before 
the definition? Besides, given Chapter 14, should not the final, psychological cause of tragedy be 
a certain kind of pleasure, and should this not be captured in the definition? Other considerations 
regarding pity and fear are discussed by Nehamas, who in my view provides an overdue analysis 
in this context of these two important emotions that too often are thought to be necessarily 
connected to catharsis, and that, contrary to it, clearly have an important role in the later chapters 
of the Poetics.39 Suffice it to say, however, that the discussions of pity and fear in the Poetics 
reveal that Aristotle intended those emotions to be part of a certain kind of mixed pleasure and 
not to be a cause of catharsis.
Another place in which a discussion of catharsis is conspicuously called for, were it really 
an essential part of tragedy, is Ch 26, when Aristotle attempts to rank tragedy above epic. On the 
traditional readings, catharsis — whether it means purgation, purification, or even clarification -  is 
supposed to make the audience better people. When we remember that both epic and tragedy for 
Plato can be harmful art forms in terms of content, and that epic can corrupt as easily as tragedy 
(Rep ΠΙ), generating catharsis seemingly becomes a prominent advantage of tragedy. It is very
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surprising, then, that Aristotle does not utilize catharsis to help accord tragedy favored status, 
especially if he is responding to Plato. Rather, the only considerations that Aristotle lists are that 
tragedy: (i) is more compressed and thus gives more intense an experience than epic (because the 
concentrated pleasure is better than the diluted one); (ii) has equal vividness in reading as well as 
representation; (iii) can use not only the metres that epic uses but others, and (iv) has all the 
elements that epic has plus music and spectacle, which give notable pleasures (1462al5-17). Why 
then does Aristotle not invoke catharsis at this opportune moment? It cannot be because epic, 
like ecstatic melodies, also gives a catharsis and because the common denominator thereby 
cancels the benefit of tragedy. The reason is that catharsis is simply not included in the entire 
account of epic.
It might be thought and has been said, that in spite of the absence of catharsis in the 
discussion of epic, it should also be the goal for Aristotle for that art form, especially if catharsis is 
a central part of his defense of poetry in general.40 When defining epic, Aristotle says that its plots 
should be constructed dramatically, about a single whole action that is complete, with a beginning, 
middle, and end, all of which is said about tragedy in Chs 6-7.41 He adds, in Ch 24, that epic has 
reversals, recognitions, and sufferings, which are the factors in Ch 18 that for him allow the 
dramatist to accomplish the tragic effect. In Ch 14, he also blatantly asserts that pity and fear in 
tragedy can be produced without spectacle and that the poet better relies on the plot for the 
effect. In merely hearing the story, a spectator will react accordingly, all of which obviously 
would apply similarly to epic. Besides, as Aristotle says, whoever knows good or bad tragedy 
knows good or bad epic;42 the epic poet Homer was the precursor of tragedians;43 and both art 
forms represent good men in action (Poetics 2). Because, then, for Aristotle epic and tragedy can 
be so alike with respect to the literary part of plot-making, the epic poet should be able, it seems, 
as much or almost as much as a tragedian to produce catharsis, which Plato appears to confirm in 
the Ion. There, the epic rhapsode Ion himself is portrayed as maintaining that he goes out of his 
senses when interpreting Homer and that, as a result, the audience weeps and casts terrible 
glances, apparently experiencing both pity and fear.44
Epic, then, has all the means it needs to produce catharsis,45 but there is absolutely no 
indication that for Aristotle it is intended to produce such an effect. And in fact, he indicates that 
the goal of epic is “to produce its proper pleasure (hédoné).”46 Later, when ranking tragedy over 
epic in Ch 26, he also asserts that tragedy fulfills its specific function as an art better, “for it does 
not give any chance pleasure, but the one proper to it, as stated.”47 It might be frustrating to 
some that Aristotle does not say at this point what this specific function is, but he does call it a 
pleasure (hêdonë), rather than a catharsis.48 The likeliest explanation, it seems to me, is that he is 
referring in this statement to the claim he had just made, namely, that tragedy attains its end within 
narrower limits than epic, an end which is cashed out there as being pleasurable. Not only is the 
reference, then, perhaps grammatically and conceptually the closest possible one, but the thought 
reiterates the previous statements from Chs 14 and 23, that giving a certain pleasure is the aim of 
the poet. Finally, on this reading the Poetics abuts neatly with the account in Pol VIH 3 and 5, an 
account that reveals entertainment and contemplative pleasure to be the best end of music and by 
implication the best end of all a rt
It is possible, of course, that the end of tragedy and epic was discussed in a lost portion of 
the Poetics or in another treatise, perhaps On Poets, and that Aristotle muddled his relatively clear
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*distinctions by identifying pleasure with catharsis. In this case, one could say that the goal of epic 
is catharsis, but there is no evidence at all from any extant Aristotelian text to attribute such a 
move to Aristotle and the distinction in the Politics VID 7 contrasting “(innocent) pleasure” with 
catharsis weighs against it anyway.
Another explanation for the omission of catharsis in epic might have to do with the issue 
of which ancient poetic forms incorporated ecstatic melodies, the melodies that Aristotle defended 
in Pol V in  7 with the doctrine of catharsis. Those melodies were apparently absent from epic, 
even though they -- or at least emotional melodies of some sort — arguably were often or always 
included in tragedy and comedy.49 However, this explanation still leaves untouched why 
Aristotle does not take advantage of catharsis to rank tragedy over epic. The omission of 
catharsis, therefore, in the discussion of epic and in the listing of the comparative benefits of both 
tragedy and epic, is, it seems to me, very strong evidence that catharsis is not a central part of 
Aristotle’s mature defense of these two art forms. There seems to be no good reason why 
Aristotle would ignore catharsis while ranking tragedy over epic other than because a mutual 
catharsis would cancel the advantage. Since we have ruled out this alternative, the most natural 
explanation seems to be that generating catharsis is simply not part of tragedy's essence.
Part Π: What Probably Led a Peripatetic to Interpolate the Catharsis Clause?
All of the foregoing reveals, I trust, that Aristotle is in a much deeper quagmire than the 
interminable debates about the meaning of catharsis picture him to be in, if he really included 
catharsis in the definition of tragedy. In fact, that quagmire is so obvious, deep, and extensive 
that a thinker as perspicacious as Aristotle could not, it seems to me, have created it himself. The 
proposal, therefore, to excise the relevant clause appears not only to be radical but appropriate. 
But then a tantalizing question arises: Who interpolated the clause, and precisely for what 
reason?
Unless more manuscripts are discovered, no absolutely convincing answer, I think, can be 
given to this question, yet it might be philosophically instructive to determine how someone might 
have felt justified in augmenting Aristotle’s text. Here is one possibility, which captures a simple 
and ingenious, if ultimately short-sighted, intuition. A later Peripatetic, knowing Pol VIII and the 
Poetics, was in the employ of Apellicon of Teos, who, on Strabo’s and Plutarch’s account, was 
restoring primarily for profit Aristotle’s manuscripts after they were damaged by being kept in 
damp underground locations at Scepsis.50 The restorer imagined that for Aristotle the following 
proportion held: tragedy is to drama (in general) as the ecstatic melodies are to music (in 
general). That is, because Aristotle uses catharsis to defend the ecstatic melodies, the restorer 
probably thought that he similarly uses it to defend tragedy, especially since tragedy often or 
always involves pity and fear, the emotions that are mentioned alongside of ecstasy in Pol VIII. 
The restorer may also have thought (and with good reason if Janko is right about Philodemus) 
that in his early Academic work Aristotle did make use of catharsis in some ways, and so the 
restorer felt justified in including catharsis in the Poetics. Furthermore, he might have felt that the 
definition would be deficient without tragedy’s final cause.
However, although this entire intuition is very plausible, it cannot represent Aristotle’s 
settled outlook, in part because it generates the many difficult problems articulated in the main 
body of this paper, and in part because of the following two considerations. With regards to the
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last and easiest consideration regarding deficient definition, when Aristotle defines man as “two- 
legged animal’’ in Met VE 12, he clearly shows that not all definitions require a final cause, and 
the theories of definition from Post Analy do not require that a final cause be included. With 
regards to the more difficult consideration, in which tragedy becomes analogous to ecstatic 
melodies, a few remarks are necessary.
First, as mentioned before, in promising an explanation of catharsis in a treatise on poetry, 
the Politics VID 7 passage has been assumed by many commentators to be sufficient to guarantee 
the integrity of the catharsis phrase in our Poetics and, I imagine, is more than anything else 
responsible for someone thinking that catharsis should be included in the definition of tragedy, 
apart from the manuscripts showing such an inclusion.51 Certainly, the Politics passage has been 
primarily responsible for the longevity of Bemay’s view that catharsis means purgation, a view 
that still has pockets of adherents. However, our Poetics has absolutely none of the explanation 
of catharsis that the Politics promises. Diogenes Laertius -- admittedly not a very reliable source 
when it comes to philosophical doctrine but apparently fairly trustworthy when it comes to 
tabulating works — lists a number of treatises of Aristotle on poetry, drama, and art, including On 
Poets (3 books). Treatise on the Art o f Poetry (2 books). Poetics (1 book). O f Tragedies (1 book). 
Dramatic Records (1 book), Dionysian Dramatic Victories (1 book), Homeric Problems (6 
books). Collection o f the Art ofTheodectes,52 and other books on art and music.53 The 
explanation of catharsis may well have appeared in another of these treatises (assuming that 
Aristotle ever fulfilled his promise in the first place to write it). This, then, means that we need 
not think on the grounds of Pol V III7 that catharsis should be in our particular Poetics and in the 
particular location it now has. It need only mean that catharsis was included in one of those other 
works or in a lost portion of our treatise, and this latter option seems ruled out for reasons given 
before, one being that Aristotle in Chs 6 and 7 never even begins to explain catharsis when he 
clearly wishes to explicate in greater detail all of the the elements of the definition of tragedy.
A second reason why Aristotle could not reasonably have held the proportion tragedy : 
drama :: ecstatic melodies : music is as follows. The term tragedy in the Poetics seems to have at 
times (especially in Chs 1-5) its archaic or more general meaning, “serious drama,” maybe 
stemming from “goat-song” or something similar, which parallels Plato’s use of the term in the 
Laws in that there is no implication of disaster or regrettableness: tragedy is merely a mimesis of 
“serious” men and the best life, in contrast with comedy.54 As Aristotle recounts in Ch 4, tragedy 
developed from the dithyramb or from the epic and focussed on heroic men. Thus, the earlier 
tragedies and, apparently, simple tragedies, those without reversals and recognitions, did not and 
for Aristotle do not always deal with heroes who were seriously threatened, and, hence, some of 
those plays never caused pity or fear on the part of the audience, just the kind of milksop drama 
that Plato imagines at times for the ideal polis and just the kind of drama that an ancient Greek 
Hollywood mentality must have produced in many instances (see, e.g., the “trivial plots” of 
1449al9). Some plays -- those, for example, with simple plots or with plots that, Aristotle says at 
1451al2, proceed from misfortune to fortune — are “tragedies,” then, without being tragic in our 
sense of the word.55 If catharsis is the goal of all tragedies, some of these would paradoxically 
appear not to be tragedies on his own criteria of Chapter 1-6.
There is one final family of reasons why the initially ingenious interpolation of the catharsis 
clause, suggesting that the whole genre of tragedy is analogous to ecstatic melodies, is not
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compatible in the long run with uncontentious Aristotelian doctrine. Tragedy is the best species 
of drama, whereas the ecstatic melodies for Aristotle do not constitute the best melodies of 
music.56 As alluded to already, the four benefits of education, enjoyment, recreation, and 
relaxation listed in Pol V III7 would be better functions of music than the fifth, merely therapeutic 
benefit of catharsis, and likewise would be better functions of tragedy (see Pol VIH 3 & 5). There 
is seemingly no other genre of drama than comedy and tragedy for Aristotle, and hence no other 
dramatic form that could function as the analog of contemplative music. It follows, I would argue 
had I more time, that catharsis should not be essential in justifying tragic practice as a whole, just 
as it is not essential in justifying non-ecstatic or general musical practice. Another, related reason 
why catharsis cannot really be the goal of all tragedy has also been touched upon and pertains to 
music being included in the definition of tragedy. Since music is one of the essential parts of 
tragedy, the five musical benefits would thus contribute to the benefit of the whole enterprise.
Yet, then, if  catharsis is to be included in the definition, the other four benefits of music should 
similarly be included. In other words, had Aristotle really wanted catharsis to be the crucial, or 
the only, goal of tragedy, he presumably would have incorporated only ecstatic music, rather than 
music in general, in the initial diaeresis or in the final definition of tragedy. Or, he would have at 
least mentioned ecstatic music when he discusses music in the other parts of the Poetics, but in 
those places he only suggests that the kind of music is primarily imitative (Ch 6), that it should 
capture the relevant mood or scene rather than being an independent interlude (Ch 18), and that it 
gives significant pleasure (Ch 26). Nothing in any of those discussions even suggests that 
catharsis is a goal of tragic music.
This is sufficient speculation regarding the interpolation of the catharsis clause in the 
definition of tragedy and why the interpolation, although superficially plausible because of the role 
of catharsis in defending ecstatic melodies, is actually licentious. I must emphasize that I think 
catharsis is a possible value of at least one of the four kinds of tragedy that Aristotle mentions in 
Ch 18 — perhaps tragedy of suffering — even while I cannot believe that it was really included by 
him as an essential element of all types of the art form.57 Thus I am in no way totally sweeping 
aside the previous discussions of catharsis, as Petrusevski effectually does with his claim that the 
original words in the definition of tragedy were actually pragmatön systasin.58 Indeed, those 
previous discussions of catharsis may prove helpful in establishing how the proper psychological 
effect was to be sought in at least one species of tragedy, and perhaps also in comedy, or at least 
may reveal what Aristotle believed in his early Academic days, when he wrote On Poets.
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ENDNOTES
1. Esp. pp. 388-390
2. The introduction of this paper was given in a greatly expanded version (“Catharsis in Plato 
and Aristotle’s Silence”) at a teleconferencing session at the annual meeting of the American 
Society for Aesthetics, Eastern Division, Spring, 1996, and I am especially grateful to John 
Brown for arranging the session and to Nicholas Pappas for the reply. Part I was presented at 
SUNY, Stony Brook, March, 1996, and I wish to thank the Philosophy Department and Robert 
Crease for their sponsorship, and for the rewarding discussions and correspondence that ensued.
3. 230b-d
4. 69b-c
5. Laws V, 735bff; Rep II, 385c and X, 607a.
6. That beauty is at least one of the ends of art for Plato can be seen at Republic ΙΠ and X 
(403c; 595c; 600e) and Laws VII (816d), and for Aristotle at Poetics 7.
7. Laws VII, 790d
8. Rep X, 607a
9. Janko claims that catharsis leads to moderation, although he returns to the meaning of 
catharsis as purgation/purification (1992, esp. pp. 345 and 350). If Janko is right, Aristotle, 
through advocating catharsis, could be addressing at least the ethical challenge. However, I 
address and reject Janko’s arguments in a forthcoming paper, “Does Catharsis Conduce to the 
Mean?,” (publisher undetermined).
10. For instance, Cynthia Freeland says "it is well-known that one of Aristotle's aims in the 
Poetics was to defend tragedy against Plato's moral critique in Republic X " (p. 111). A 
psychologist, T. Scheff, states “Responding to Plato’s condemnation of drama for arousing the 
passions, and thereby undermining the State, Aristotle contended that drama may produce 
catharsis by purging the audience of pity and terror (p. 20).”
11. The passages are conveniently located in Janko, 1987, pp. 59-61. Janko also says “The 
first definite citation [of any passage in the Poetics, but not one pertaining to catharsis] is that in 
Porphyry, quoted by Simplicius In Categ, p. 36.16-31 " (1991, p. 7, f. #25). James Hutton, 
however, says
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Themistius (fourth century A.D.) takes from [the Poetics} the reference to the 
origin of comic plots in Sicily (Oratio 27, 337B from 1449b6), but [the Poetics] is 
not cited by title in any surviving writer earlier than the fifth century after Christ, 
when Ammonius and Boethius (fifth-sixth century) quote Chapter 20 on the “parts 
of speech” in their commentaries on the Aristotelian treatise On Interpretation (p.
24).
12. For instance, Proclus says that Aristotle had grounds for complaint against Plato because 
“it is possible to satisfy the emotions in due measure, and, by satisfying them, to keep them 
tractable for education, by treating the ache in them” (Janko tr., 1987, p. 60). However, as is 
clear from the Aristotelian ethical treatises (e.g., Nie Eth Π and ΠΙ), and as Nehamas indirectly 
shows (especially pp. 296-297), emotions like fear are not made tractable for education by having 
an ache treated or by satisfying them. It is habituation involving a rational component (or 
following a rational set of guidelines) that allows people to develop proper emotions. That is, one 
learns to handle fear by learning how to handle fearful circumstances, and if anything it is by 
suppressing or ignoring the fear or through some similar mechanism, not satisfying it, that one 
becomes more fearless.
13. See Stephen Halliwell, 1986, esp. pp. 195-156 and 201ff, for how Pol VID 7 might be 
relevant to tragedy and for one of the most sophisticated defenses of the “clarification” view.
Also see J. Lear, who rightly in my view undercuts HalbwelTs arguments (esp. pp. 319 ff).
Finally, see endnote 9.
14. I cannot repeat in any detail the massive secondary and tertiary literature showing why the 
three meanings of catharsis are not workable for the Poetics, but the following very brief summary 
might be useful. Catharsis cannot mean purgation because purging pity and fear would be too 
Platonic or too Speusippian a doctrine, involving an overly pessimistic attitude toward these 
emotions. For Aristotle, pity and fear should be felt in appropriate circumstances, and, 
furthermore, pity would not by its nature be able homeopathically to purge pity. Neither can 
catharsis mean purification because people or desirable emotions rather than unwanted emotions 
are the kinds of things that are purified. A person, especially a warrior, with pure(-ified) fear 
would not be a better, more courageous person than his counterpart, and would be even more of 
an anathema to a person who is worried about the Platonic critique of art. And, again, as with 
purgation, it is implausible to say that for Aristotle pity purifies pity. Finally, catharsis cannot 
mean clarification given the passage in Pol VIH 7, in which Aristotle distinguishes the cathartic 
melodies that are appropriate in the performances of music held in the theatre from the ethical 
ones that should be used primarily in education. Catharsis is not an ethical or clarificatory process 
in that passage, and by extension, would not be a clarificatory one in tragedy.
Lear gives an excellent account of why none of the three commonplace meanings are 
appropriate, and offers “relief’ as the sense of catharsis. However, relief suggests also that pity 
and fear are undesirable, and hence this translation in my view is saddled with many of the 
problems of “purgation.”
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15. See endnote 58.
16. M. Pabst Battin, 1974, p. 155.
17. I find it surprising that scholars like Nussbaum, who take the view both that catharsis 
means clarification and that the goal of tragedy is cognitive, do not seem to make use of the 
reading mathématôn. Nevertheless, I doubt this reading will get them much further, partly 
because there is no hint of such an interpretation later in the Poetics, when Aristotle discusses the 
elements of the definition.
18. I. Bywater, 1909, p. 98. Battin presents a rather different diaeresis, but Bywater’s 
divisions form the crux of it (1975, p. 298).
19. 1449a5; a l 5 ; a l 9 ; b l l .  It perhaps should be noted that Aristotle presents two of the 
distinctions in the two chapters that deal with the historical development of tragedy, whereas the 
first three chapters had been almost exclusively logical, employing the distinction between the 
three modes of mimesis.
20. A few have mentioned in private that perhaps Aristotle did not intend the catharsis clause 
to be part of the definition. If so, one of my goals -- to show that catharsis is not central to his , 
defense of tragedy, whether or not against Plato — has been reached. However, it would be 
stunning (to me at least) if the clause were not intended as part of the definition, given that the 
explanation which immediately follows that clause, explicating the meaning of terms in the 
definition, shows that Aristotle has not left his focus on the definition.
21. 97a22ff
22. Esp. 1038a25-35. Without taking full account of the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics 
VH 12, Battin says “the order of the differentiae is slightly changed, but this of course has no 
effect upon the accuracy of the definition” (1975, p. 295). She may be right, for reasons I offer 
later, but these reasons then take us away from the kind of definition she assumes Aristotle is 
using.
23. Else, p. 16. Else rejects Platonic dichotomy, saying that epic cannot be included in the 
right-hand division of the first two “cuts” because it has no song, that is, melos (p. 67). But epic 
may have music in that it has accompaniment, even if it does not have full song, as is suggested by 
Book 8, line 250ff, of the Odyssey: the assembled guests must wait while the poet Demodocus 
gets a lyre before reciting. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that melos means “song” in Poetics 
1, for it is used interchangeably with harmonía there, just to mean “tune” (1447a22 & b25).
24. Hutton does recognize very well the connection of the general theory of definition in the 
Post An to the Poetics (pp. 9-13), but attempts implausibly to explain away the elements that 
actually come from Chs 4 & 5:
We may surmise that the diaeresis of Chs 1 through 3, which has successfully 
provided a rational background for the "parts," was set up chiefly for that very 
purpose. To supply all the differentiae that would yield a stringent definition of 
tragedy, though theoretically possible, would be tedious and impractical...
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Accordingly, Aristotle has not scrupled to add to the definition the properties or 
qualities that are requisite for tragedy (p. 13).
As we have seen, however, the final few differentiae require neither a tedious nor an impractical 
discussion.
25. Else, 1963, pp. 221-232 and esp. 439ff. Else interprets the phrase ek ton eiremenon ton 
ginomenon horon tes ousias as referring to a process of becoming: "(Let us talk about tragedy...) 
picking out from what has been said the definition of its essence as it was (which was, which we 
saw in process of) becoming" (p. 222). Yet he still says the "items in the definition...are in fact 
taken both from the systematic chapters 1-3 and from the ‘history’ [of Ch 4-5]" (p. 222).
26. Leon Golden and O.B. Hardison, Jr., 1981, pp. 114-115.
27. Nussbaum, 1992, p. 281-282.
28. For instance, see Battin, 1975, p. 300, and Lear, pp. 318-326, esp. 321-322.
29. Π 13, 96a24-96b24
30. Of course, the chapters were not separated in the original Greek, but were part of one 
continuous manuscript. According to private correspondence from Doug Hutchinson, to whom I 
am indebted for this history, the chapters were not marked off until the third edition of the Greek 
omnibus of Aristotle, Basle, 1550. The first omnibus, the Aldine from Venice in 1495-98, did not 
include the Poetics or the Rhetoric; rather those texts appeared in the Aldine press’s Rhetor es 
Graeci in 1508-9. The second omnibus of Aristotle’s work, Basle, 1531, included marginal 
lineation, and a second edition of that work in 1539 contained no internal means of reference. 
Finally, in 1550, in the third edition of the Basle work, the chapter divisions were introduced, by 
Simon Griener, Conrad Gesner et al.
31. In my PhD dissertation (1992), I argue that music and performance are essential, and 
spectacle necessary, for the kind of tragedy that Aristotle analyzes in the Poetics. Alternatively, 
see my “Poetics of Performance.”
32. 1456a25ff
33. 1459M0; 1461b31ff; 1462a3ff; 1462al6
34. For instance, see the end of Ch 1 5 ,1454M5-17, which, however, is subject to much 
controversy.
35. 1450a22ff
36. Walter Watson has pointed out in private correspondence that the plot seems to be the 
intermediate end and that the catharsis would be the final end, or function. Yet, even granting this 
distinction, it is still surprising that Aristotle does not mention the difference, if only to forego
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discussing it. Moreover, catharsis is treated as the intermediate end to pleasure in Pol VIH 7, and 
pleasure is treated as the end of poetry in the later chapters of the Poetics.
37. 1453M0-14
38. At 48a of the Philebus, Plato says that the “audience at tragedy and comedy feel pleasure 
and weep at once,” and at 50b he reports that “pleasure is mixed with pain in lamentations, 
tragedy, and comedy.”
39. Nehamas ends his very compelling article by addressing the catharsis issue. He translates 
the term as dénouement and reinterprets the catharsis clause in a strikingly original manner, thus 
making the Poetics much more cohesive philosophically. I note some of the problems with his 
view, however, in “Catharsis in Plato, and Aristotle’s Silence” (see endnote 2).
40. Hutton says that the Poetics ends “with a comparison of tragedy and epic in order to show 
that the common function (the stirring of pity and fear) is best performed by tragedy” (1982, p. 6). 
Also, Kenneth Telford claims that “as Ch 26 states, tragedy and epic have the same function -- 
namely the catharsis of pity and fear” (1961, p. 74). Yet, neither author cites any precise passage, 
and, contrary to Telford’s explicit claim, the text never states that the function of epic is to give 
the catharsis of pity and fear.
41. 1459al7ff
42. Ch 4,144913
43. 1449a5-7; also see Ch 24
44. 533d, and esp 535d-3
45. Halliwell says “epic ¡catharsis ought to be entailed by Ar.’s own comparison between 
tragedy and epic at 59b7-15; it was widely accepted in the Renaissance (though often for the 
wrong reasons), and has been in modem times by e.g. Rostagni” (1986, p. 200). Halliwell, 
unfortunately perhaps for us, does not explore the ramifications of this particular insight
46. Ch 2 3 ,1459al7ff
47. 1462M3
48. Hutton stresses in numerous places that “pleasure (which need not be mindless) is the only 
external purpose for poetry that the Poetics recognizes” (p. 11; also pp. 8-9,14,18-19, and 22).
49. See W est esp. pp. 33 ,105,351, and 355. West also recounts Aristoxenus’s statement (fr 
79) that “Sophocles was credited with introducing the Phrygian mode to tragedy and using it in a 
rather dithyrambic manner,” p. 352.
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50. Strabo in detail (Geography ΧΙΠ 1, c. 54) and Plutarch briefly (Sylla, c. 26) recount the 
history of the transmission of Aristotle’s library. Strabo remarks on the damage because of 
moisture and of moths to the manuscripts, which were kept underground in Asia Minor by 
Neleus’s descendants to save them from the book-robbing kings of Pergamum. Apellicon of 
Teos, who purchased the library for a significant sum, was more concerned according to Strabo 
with books than with philosophy and was responsible for many faults in the subsequent 
restorations. Petrusevski argues, on the basis of various lacunae in the Poetics, that Strabo and 
Plutarch have not concocted a story (1954, pp. 240 and 244); see endnote 58.
My thesis does not depend on Strabo being correct, for there could have been any number 
of causes of a textual corruption or of an interpolation. Yet, I know of no evidence that Strabo’s 
account is mistaken.
51. Sparshott says “it is absurd to suppose that the [catharsis] clause [in the definition of 
tragedy] does not hark back to that passage [in the Politics], in which we are told of a ¡catharsis 
of pity and fear and promised further information about ¡catharsis in some work on poetry” (1983, 
p. 19). However, he, for one, seems to recognize that the absurdity depends on accepting that the 
catharsis clause deserves to be kept, for he recognizes that one might consider rejecting the 
catharsis clause altogether (p. 20). He opts to pursue a more difficult and less radical solution 
that I offer here, and that is to see catharsis as being a vague or rich term for Aristotle, one which 
“evokes a number of contexts and experiences without specifying any one or any set of them...
[As Sparshott adds:] the vagueness of what he wrote shows that he had nothing precise in mind” 
(p. 26). This solution is similar to one that Watson seems to embrace although for Watson, as far 
as I can understand him, the term catharsis seems to include every possible goal in the Poetics, 
and so in an important sense is not vague but all-encompassing. Sparshott’s and Watson’s 
solutions, though, do not address the issues of this paper.
52. Theodectes is one of the three fourth-century tragedians that Aristotle mentions. The 
other two are Carcinus and Astydamas. I owe this point to Hutton (p. 23).
53. Diogenes Laertius: Lives o f the Eminent Philosophers, 1950, pp. 22-27. Daniel de 
Montmollin thinks that the Poetics (1 book) is our Poetics (1951, p. 178ff). Janko, however, 
thinks that it is the first book of Treatise on Art o f Poetry (2 books) (1991, p. 55). Hutton says 
that “our Poetics is generally thought to be the first book of a work designated in the lists as 
Pragmateia Technës Poëdkès (!Treatise on the Art o f Poetry) in two books, the second book, 
presumably containing an account of comedy, being lost to us” (1982, p. 4).
54. Laws VH 817b. Lillian Lawler, in her rigorous study of dance in ancient Greek theatre, 
indicates that the term tragedy was even used more broadly at times. While speaking of late 
writers and lexicographers of antiquity, she says:
Philoxenus the dithyrambist, for example, is called tragikos by a scholiast on 
Aristophanes’ Plutus (290). By some late authors the word seems to be used 
literally, as coming from tragos, “goat,” and referring to the dances of the satyr 
play; we may instance Etymologicum Magnum 764, s.v. “tragoedia,” where 
tragedy and the satyr play are obviously confused, and where the choruses are said
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at times to imitate the schemata of goats. Many modem scholars think that in the
lexicographers the word tragikos means merely “pertaining to the drama” (p. 34).
55. Aristotle speaks of tragedy as if it must involve pity and fear in Chs 9 (1452a2-3), 11 
(1452bl), 13 (1452b33), and 14 (1453blff). But, the chapters in whole or in part may have been 
added after a first redaction. In Ch 13 (1453a23ff), plays with unhappy endings are most tragic 
and the best. In Ch 14, though, the Cresphontes is cited as an example of the best kind of 
tragedy, those that end happily (1454a5ff). No one to my knowledge has ever resolved this 
contradiction convincingly. It seems to me that the chapters may be from different periods, or 
may have been collated by a later editor, and, if so, that Ch 14 may have been earlier (“middle- 
period Aristotle”), because it seems to fit better with Chs 1-5. Ch 13 may then have resulted 
because arguably over a period of time during Aristotle’s life “tragedy” became more restricted to 
plays with unhappy endings (rather than just to serious drama, although it continues to mean that, 
too, at times). Also, Ch 13 or 14 (as well as other portions of our Poetics) may have come from 
the book O f Tragedies. This may well resolve the contradiction between the two chapters, 
because the term tragedy would have a slightly different context or meaning in each. Scholars like 
de Montmollin argue for there being different redactions of the Poetics, and there is very wide­
spread agreement that some chapters have been interpolated from other texts. Finally, even 
granting that tragedy always involves pity and fear, the question of whether these emotions need 
be bound up with catharsis or are only part of a certain kind of pleasure (as in Ch 14) becomes 
crucial, and I have addressed this already.
56. I presume that Aristotle ranked tragedy not only over epic but over comedy, too, given 
that comedy represents men who are phauloU bad or ignoble (Poetics 2). However, there may be 
ways in which comedy is better (and indeed Aristotle praises it in Ch 5 for being the first dramatic 
genre to come up with “universal” plots as opposed to particular, historical stories).
57. There are four species of tragedy given in Poetics 18 — complex tragedy, tragedy of 
suffering, tragedy of character, and either tragedy of spectacle or simple tragedy (1455b32- 
1456a3). The text is corrupt and opsis (spectacle) is not definite. The other option is that the 
fourth species is “of simple plots,” the reason being that Aristotle says in Ch 24 (1459b9) that 
there are four kinds of epic, as of tragedy, and he lists them as simple, complex, (of) character, 
and (of) suffering, with the last three terms being exactly the same as the uncorrupted terms which 
denote the species of tragedy: haplê, peplegmenë, êthikê, pathëtikë.
It may be that only tragedy of suffering is designed for catharsis, even if the others involve 
pity and fear (which, as I have stressed, may primarily be required only to give a certain kind of 
pleasure). However, I will not argue this point, because Aristotle says so little about the four 
kinds of tragedy. Rather, I simply propose that an alternative proportion holds — tragedy o f 
suffering : drama :: ecstatic melodies : music -- for just as there are different musical species, 
only one of which involves catharsis, the same may well hold for tragedy. It may be that in a lost 
text Aristotle designates catharsis as the precise end of tragedy of suffering, either without 
designating it as the end of the other species or expressly excluding it from the other species.
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«58. Petrusevski’s view was written first in 1948 and published more widely in 1954. A 
summary of the view is neatly presented by Teddy Brunius, who says that he is inclined to believe 
Petrusevski’s conjecture. But Brunius, apparently recognizing that a four-hundred year puzzle 
generates a life of its own that resists demise, states that the conjecture “is almost too elegant and 
too reasonable to be accepted at once” (p. 270).
Petrusevski’s view is this: The word katharsis was never written by Aristotle. Rather, the 
original phrase conveyed the idea that tragedy has, or produces, pity and fear in the actions 
brought together (pragmatön systasin). These last two words subsequently were corrupted, and 
were thought later by scholars who knew Pol V III7 to be pathëmatôn katharsin. Petrusevski 
goes so far as to claim that there is no tragic catharsis, only a musical catharsis, which was 
discussed in a lost portion of the Poetics that dealt with music.
I agree with Petrusevski that there may be a lost portion that discussed music, because, as 
Chs 1 and 6 show, music is one of the essential properties of Aristotelian tragedy. Petrusevski 
may also be right about there only being a musical catharsis, partly for reasons given before in this 
paper, but only if music here is used broadly to include dance; even then, however, the claim is 
arguable. At any rate, one of Petrusevski's reasons for rejecting catharsis has to do with his 
recognition that the definition will be abrogated because no previous discussion of catharsis takes 
place before the definition itself (1954, p 240). Therefore, I cannot accept his ingenious solution 
because, likewise, pity and fear are not discussed either in Chs 1-5, and should not be in the 
definition. To be consistent, Petrusevski should omit the entire pity and fear clause. If he were to 
reply that on my own account of Aristotle’s third type of definition, using “necessary and \
sufficient conditions” (Post Analyt Π 13, 96a24-96b24), the entire pragmatön systasin clause 
could have been added without a preliminary division, I would agree. However, it is then still 
problematic that pity and fear are never mentioned in Chs 6-7, when Aristotle explains all of the 
other elements, including plot. Moreover, although the inclusion of pragmatön systasin is benign, 
in that it clearly covers what is essential in all tragedies, the same thing does not appear to be the 
case with respect to pity and fear. As I discussed earlier, if  we look at Chs 1-5, in which the term 
tragedy really only seems to mean “serious drama,” it seems that there are cases in which tragedy 
does not imply pity and fear. In the later chapters (e.g. Ch 13), the word tragedy appears to have 
become more restrictive, but this may only mean that the various chapters come from different 
works and from different periods, and that Aristotle has captured a change in Greek usage over 
some decades (see endnote 55). Petrusevski’s solution would obscure all of this.
20
